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Abstract
Logit models are estimated for citrus and vineyard crops to show under what land quality
conditions water price is an effective policy tool for inducing adoption of modern irrigation
technologies, and how welfare impacts of water policy depend on cropping patterns and the
distribution of land quality characteristics.
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During the last decade there has been a dramatic increase in the regulation of agricultural water
use stemming from the increased demands on existing water supplies for urban and
environmental purposes.  Because development of additional water supplies has become
politically unpopular and because agriculture uses over 80% of consumed water, it has been
suggested that water be reallocated from agriculture to meet increases in demand.  Economists
have long recommended that policy makers use water price as a tool to encourage increases in
water use efficiency to help mitigate the increase in water demand and reduce the impact of
reallocation.  The benefit of using water price as a policy tool, rather than a quantity control, is
that it allows the grower a higher degree of flexibility to adjust to the change in policy.  Since
growers in a given region may produce different crops under different production conditions
adjustments made to minimize the impact of a change in policy will differ for each grower, and
consequently, some growers will be impacted more severely than others.  The objective of this
paper is to identify under what agronomic conditions investments in modern irrigation
technologies will be made as a result of changes in water price and show that the distribution
of policy impacts depends critically on the type of crop grown and the production environment.
There is an extensive literature on irrigation technology adoption that has shown both
theoretically and empirically that the adoption decision depends critically on water price and
land quality.  Caswell and Zilberman (1986) showed theoretically that the adoption decision is
effected by well depth (i.e. water price), land quality and crop type.  Though the empirical
literature supports these findings (Cason and Uhlaner; Caswell and Zilberman [1985]; Green et
al.; Negri and Brooks; and Nieswiadomy), the interdependent effect of water price, land quality
and crop type on irrigation technology choice has not been examined empirically.  For
example, Caswell and Zilberman (1986) used comparative statics to demonstrate theoretically
that when soil quality is sufficiently high, increases in the depth to ground water will not induce
the adoption of modern irrigation technologies.  Further, it has been shown that land quality is2
an important determinant of cropping patterns (Lichtenberg; and Plantinga) and that it is
common to observe similar crops being grown on land with similar qualities.  While soil
permeability may be critical to the adoption of a technology for one crop, it may have only a
small effect on adoption for an alternative crop.  In fact, soil permeability may be so important
that water price has only a small affect on technology adoption.  Consequently, one would
expect that the relative significance of land quality and water price in the adoption decision to
vary by crop.  This has important implications to the welfare effects of water pricing policy.
The relative importance of land quality and water price to the adoption decision for different
crops is truly an empirical question and will ultimately determine the effectiveness of water
price as a policy tool for inducing irrigation technology adoption.
Agronomic factors place natural constraints on the adoption of irrigation technologies
that may diminish the effectiveness of water price as a policy tool in some cases and enhance it
in others.  The result being that changes in water use and welfare impacts that result from
water policy may follow the distribution of cropping patterns and land quality.  Understanding
the combined effect of water price, land quality and crop type will help predict grower
response to water policy and estimate the distribution of welfare impacts as they relate to land
quality and crop type.  To isolate the relationship between land quality and water price we
estimate adoption functions for gravity and drip irrigation technologies on citrus and vineyard
crops, which allow us to quantify the differential effect of land quality and water price on
technology choice.  Discrete choice models are used to estimate the probability of adoption of
irrigation technologies and quantify the interactive effects of water price and land quality
variables on the adoption decision.  A cross-sectional field-level data set is used to estimate
these relationships.  The results of the study are discussed and shown graphically, we conclude
by highlighting the important policy implications of the study.
Empirical Model3
The adoption decision is based on the profitability, pij, of crop production under the ith
irrigation technology on the jth field.  The theoretical and empirical literature on technology
adoption has shown that the profitability of production under a given technology is influenced
by a vector of field characteristics, X, including the price of water, w, which varies across
fields.  Thus, when considering the irrigation adoption decision, perceived profit are a function
of field characteristics and water price, pij(X).
1  For a grower to consider adopting a modern
irrigation technology the perceived profit differential under the ith technology must be at least
as large as those under the traditional technology, Dp = pij - p0j > 0, where i = 0 denotes the
traditional technology.  Further, for water pricing policy to be effective in encouraging the
adoption of a modern irrigation technology, changes in water price must increase the profit
differential between the alternative technologies (i.e. MDp(X)/Mw>0 ).  Unfortunately it is not
possible to determine how changes in water price will effect the profit differential theoretically,
and so must be determined empirically.
The grower is assumed to maximize expected utility by selecting the irrigation
technology with the highest perceived profits, given by pij(X) = fij(X) + eij.  Here fij(X) is a
nonstochastic function of field characteristics and water price and eij is a scalar that represents
unobserved characteristics.  Rather than estimate the perceived profits directly, discrete choice
models can be used to estimate the probability of adopting a given technology as a function of
field level variables.  This implies that the higher the probability of adoption for a given
technology, the larger the perceived profits are for that technology.  We assume that fij(X)
takes the form b biNXj, where b bi i is a vector of estimable parameters associated with the
irrigation technology and Xj is a vector of observed field characteristics and water price.
Because we are interested in the profit differential between the modern and traditional
irrigation technologies it is necessary to make an assumption on the distribution of the
                                               
1 For a complete theoretical development of production profits when considering adoption of alternative
irrigation technologies see Caswell and Zilberman (1986).  Also, variables that do not vary by field in the cross-
sectional data set, such as crop price, are not included in the profit function for this analysis since they would
be the same for each observation.4
difference between the eij's.  Assuming that the eij's are random independent variables with a
Weibull distribution, the distribution of the difference between the eij's is logistic (Domencich
and McFadden).  We focus on the adoption of two groups of irrigation technologies: low-
pressure, which includes drip and micro-sprinkler; and gravity, which is considered the
traditional or base technology, and includes furrow, border and flood irrigation.  This reduces
the model to a binomial logit that relates the probability of choosing the low-pressure
technology to the characteristics of the field.  To remove an indeterminacy in the model the
b b0’s are normalized to equal zero.  Consequently, the irrigation technology index i is no longer









b ; j = 1, J.
To demonstrate the inter-related effect of land quality and water price on irrigation
technology choice for a specific crop, data was collected from the Arvin-Edison Water Storage
District (the District), which is located in the southern San Joaquin Valley in Central
California.  There is a wide variation in irrigation technologies, topography and soil types
within the District.  We focus on citrus and vineyard crops, both perennials that have
historically used similar irrigation technologies.  This allows us to show that even for similar
crops land quality and water price do not effect technology choice in the same manner.
Vineyard crops in the District are almost exclusively different varieties of table grapes and
citrus crops are oranges, grapefruit, lemons and limes.  The data on irrigation technology, field
size, water price, and water source were collected for the 1993 growing year by the District
(Table 1).  Citrus and vineyard crops are grown almost exclusively with flood and drip
irrigation.  In fact, only 3 of the 274 citrus observations and 4 of the 423 vineyard observations
use high-pressure sprinkler systems.  Consequently, the observations with high-pressure
sprinkler were removed from the data set and the irrigation choice for these crops was5
modeled to be between flood and drip systems.  Otherwise, all citrus and vineyard crops grown
in the District are included in the data set.
Whether surface water, ground water or both are available on a given field depends on
where in the District the field is located.  If a field has access to high quality ground water it
may not be in the District’s service area and is not able to receive surface water.  Only 61% of
the fields in our sample receive surface water.
2  The energy cost for pumping ground water is
assumed to be the marginal price of water for growers that do not have access to surface
water. Pumping cost is estimated by the District based on depth to ground water and the
energy cost for the size of pump needed to lift water from a given depth, and ranges from $40
to $88 per acre-foot.  The variable component of the District’s water rate is used as the
marginal price of water for fields that have access to surface water.  Though the marginal price
of ground water is about $25 per acre-foot more than that of surface water, the fixed
component of the District charge for surface water is set so that the total price for ground and
surface water are approximately equal, ranging from $50 to $110 per acre-foot.  The range in
water price through out the District stems from variation in elevation.
The Kern County Natural Resource Conservation Service collected data on soil
permeability and field slope, which are used to define land quality.  The land quality data are
specified for each quarter section, which is a 160-acre plot.  District land maps were used to
match each field to its respective quarter section.  Permeability and slope were given in inches
per hour and percent, respectively.  Both permeability and slope were given in ranges, and the
midpoint was taken and used to construct weighted averages for each quarter section.
There are five explanatory variables:  four continuous; (i) price of water, (ii) soil
permeability, (iii) field slope, and (iv) field size, and one binary; (v) water source (i.e., ground
water or both ground and surface water).  Table 1 shows that there is substantial variation in
                                               
2 Because growers in the District rely heavily on ground water to irrigate crops it is necessary for the District to
operate a conjunctive use system.  In fact, one of the primary charges of the District is to recharge the ground
water aquifer with imported surface water.6
the explanatory variables.  Irrigation technology is the dependent variable and the gravitational
technology is used as the benchmark technology for both of the citrus and vineyard models.
To quantify the effect of field characteristics and water price on irrigation technology choice
the data is used to estimate the logit models.  The probability of adoption and the marginal
effects of each variable are also calculated.
Estimation Results
The estimation results show that the citrus model has a better fit than the vineyard model,
though both models perform well (Table 2).  To measure the performance of the models the
R2, the likelihood ratio test, and the percentage of correct predictions are reported.  Each of
these measures is given since no single measure alone is reliable for describing a model’s
performance (Maddala).  The vineyard model has a low R2, though this is not unusual for
qualitative choice models.  It has been shown that obtaining a low R2 when calculating the
correlation between a binary dependent variable and the corresponding predicted probability
may not imply that the model is a poor fit (Morrison).  Since the likelihood ratio test and the
percentage of correct predictions both show a good fit for the vineyard model, the low R2 is
not given much weight in judging the model’s performance.  All of the measures of
performance for the citrus model show that the model performs well.  However, we do note
that the citrus model tends to over predict the adoption of drip, while the vineyard model
slightly under predicts the adoption of drip.
The most striking difference between the citrus and vineyard results is the effect of
water price on the irrigation technology adoption.  While the coefficient on the water price
variable for citrus crops is very significant, the water price coefficient on vineyard crops is
small and insignificant.  This is interesting since both crops face a similar average price of
water per acre-foot and historically have experienced similar changes in the water price.  This
result demonstrates that the effectiveness of water price as a policy tool may vary substantially7
depending on cropping patterns.  Which has important implications to the distribution of
welfare impacts of water pricing policy.
The other variables have similar effects on the coefficients of adoption of low-pressure
systems for both citrus and vineyard crops.  Though the coefficients on citrus are larger in
magnitude then those on vineyard, they are of similar significance.  This is somewhat surprising
given that on average citrus crops are grown on fields that have a higher gradient and lower
permeability than fields with vineyard crops.  To make an easier comparison between the effect
of the variables on the probability of adoption for citrus and vineyard crops the probabilities
and elasticities of adoption are given in Table 3.  Water price and field slope have the largest
elasticities and most significant effects on technology choice in citrus crops.  For vineyard
crops we find that gradient is an important determinant of technology adoption, even though
the average gradient of vineyard acreage is only 1.32 percent.  The elasticity shows that a one
percent increase in the gradient results in almost a half percent increase in the probability that a
low-pressure system will be adopted.  Soil permeability is also important to technology choice
in vineyard crops.  In our sample vineyard crops had the highest average soil permeability at
3.77 inches per hour, which is 73 percent higher than the average permeability of soils for
citrus crops.  Water price is not an important factor for technology adoption in vineyard crops.
This finding may be explained by the fact that vineyard growers believe that vines are more
susceptible to disease when grown with drip irrigation.  The use of a drip system causes the
vine to have a smaller root system than the use of a gravity system.  Though there is some
antidotal evidence of this, it has not been shown conclusively.  This is not a problem with citrus
crops because it is possible to use multiple drip emitters, which creates a larger root system.
Growers have begun experimenting with low-pressure sprinklers on vine crops, though this
may increase moisture on the fruit and cause decay.  Consequently, many vineyard growers are
not willing to switch to low-pressure irrigation since they perceive this technology as a threat8
to the longevity of their crops which have a high cost of replacement.  In such a case, the use
of water price as a policy tool would most likely not induce adoption of low-pressure systems.
For a better understanding of the effectiveness of water price as a policy tool to induce
irrigation technology adoption in different crops and in the presence of varying land quality we
graphed the probability of adoption as a function of the water price and land quality variables.
We choose to examine the effect of these variables since they have been found to be the most
important in the existing literature and are the focus of this analysis.  Figures 1 and 2 show iso-
probability lines for citrus crops, pairing water price with each of the land quality variables
3.
The effect of land quality and water price on adoption is found by varying the level of the
variables for each model while holding the probability of adoption constant.  As is standard, we
assume that adoption occurs when the probability of adoption is greater than 0.5 (Greene).  In
Figure 1 we show that the probability of adoption for low-pressure systems in citrus crops
increases as either water price, field gradient, or both increase.  That is, on citrus fields that
have a high gradient, water price is more likely to be an effective policy tool.  However, in
Figure 2 we show that soil permeability has very little effect on the effectiveness of water price
as a policy tool.  That is, in citrus crops water price is equally effective for all levels of soil
permeability.  In both Figures 1 and 2 it takes a substantial change in water price to increase
the probability of adoption from 0.75 to 0.99
4, which indicates that the elasticity of adoption
with respect to water price decreases as price increases.  This implies that in areas that already
have high water prices there will be a smaller response to increases in water price, as compared
to areas that have lower water prices.
Different levels of water price were simulated to demonstrate the effect of water price
on irrigation technology adoption and water use for citrus and vineyard crops (Figure 3).
Adoption in citrus is much more sensitive to variation in water price than in vineyard crops,
                                               
3 Similar figures for vines are not shown to conserve space.  The vineyard figures showed that water price has
almost no effect on technology adoption when compared to field gradient and very little effect when compared
to soil permeability.
4 The probability of 0.99 is used rather than a probability of 1.0 because using 1.0 results in a division by zero.9
demonstrating that other variables are more critical to the adoption decision in vineyard crops.
The lack of sensitivity to changes in water price of vineyard relative to citrus crops may in part
be due the fact that the consumptive water use of vines in the District is 29% less than that for
citrus, 2.7 acre-feet per acre for citrus and 2.1 acre-feet per acre for vineyard (JMLord).  To
estimate the change in water use from increases in water price it is assumed that flood
irrigation has a 70% efficiency and that drip has a 87% efficiency (Sanden and Hockett), so
adoption produces a 24% increase in irrigation efficiency.  It is important to note that adoption
of drip technologies is the only response modeled, which will tend to under estimate reductions
in water use due to increases in water price.  Other responses may include crop stressing,
increased water management, or refinement of the existing irrigation system.  However, our
results demonstrate that the demand for low-pressure irrigation technologies for these crops is
influenced by the presence of different field characteristics, and as a result welfare impacts of
water price policy will depend on cropping patterns and physical production conditions.
Growers that are able to more easily able to adopt low-pressure technologies will realize
smaller profit losses as a result of increases in water price.  Interestingly enough, over the last
decade while vineyard acreage has remained relatively constant, citrus acreage has almost
doubled.  During this same time period marginal water price has also almost doubled.
Conclusions
We have modeled the adoption of drip irrigation technologies as a function of water price and
field characteristics contingent on the decision to produce citrus and vineyard crops.  Though
citrus and vineyard crops are both perennial crops that are grown with the same irrigation
technologies, the pattern and impetus of technology adoption for each is quite different.  Citrus
crops are much more sensitive to changes in water price.  Consequently, while increases in
water price may lead to the adoption of water saving technologies in citrus crops that reduce
policy impacts to citrus growers, adoption is less likely in vineyard crops and growers will bear10
a relatively larger portion of the welfare loss.  This implies that welfare impacts from water
policy may depend critically on cropping patterns.
The distribution of welfare impacts will also depend on the land quality of the specific
field a given crop is grown on. The probability of adoption of low-pressure irrigation
technologies is lower on fields that have higher land quality since these fields may give rise to
high irrigation efficiencies under traditional gravity technologies.  For example, adoption is less
likely to occur on a field that is relatively flat.  Consequently, increases in water price may not
justify adoption, resulting in a pure profit lose without a reduction in water use no matter what
crop is grown.  We do not suggest that water price is a poor policy tool.  Rather, we show that
using price as a policy tool is similar to applying a uniform tax to an externality with spatial
variation, thereby causing unnecessary deadweight loss.  However, we have only examined
changes in irrigation technology, which ignores the growers ability to increase the efficiency of
the traditional gravity system.  To the degree that increases in water price induce increases in
the efficiency of existing systems, the deadweight loss will be reduced.
Our results support the finding that heterogeneity of asset quality is critical in the
general study of technology adoption (Bellon and Taylor; and Perrin and Winkelmann).
Because the irrigation technology adoption decision depends critically on crop type and land
quality it will be difficult to predict welfare impacts of water price policies with models based
on regional averages and aggregated data.  This highlights the importance of incorporating
differences in physical or geographical conditions in explaining adoption behavior, and points
out that geographic information must be combined with economic data to accurately predict
adoption patterns and the distribution of welfare impacts.11







Water price ($/acre-foot) 56.06   8.20 54.20 10.42
Soil permeability (in./hr.)   2.21   3.35   3.77   3.23
Field gradient (%)   2.56   1.64   1.32   1.02
Field size (acres) 44.23 61.73 55.42 53.51
Surface water
* (0/1)   0.61  --   0.37  --
*The mean represents the percentage of fields that are able to get surface water.  Consequently, the
standard deviation is not relevant.
Table 2: Estimation Results for Low-Pressure versus Gravity Irrigation Systems
on Citrus and Vineyard Crops
Citrus Vineyard
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
Constant -9.667 -5.613 -2.350 -2.801
Water price ($/acre-foot)  0.138  4.735  0.002  0.115
Soil permeability (in./hr.)  0.086  1.551  0.067  1.902
Field gradient (%)  0.985  5.324  0.520  4.202
Field size (acres)  0.017  2.740  0.004  2.125
Surface water (0/1)  0.719  1.966  0.537  2.107
Observations 271 419
R2 0.35 0.12
Likelihood ratio test: c5
2 100.15 47.19
Correct prediction 80% 74%
Table 3: Probabilities and Elasticities
* of Adoption for Citrus and Vineyard Crops
Citrus Vineyard
Variable Gravity Low-Pressure Gravity Low-Pressure
Probability of Adoption   0.13   0.87   0.71   0.29
Water price ($/acre-foot) (-6.65)   (1.01) (-0.03)   (0.07)
Soil permeability (in./hr.) (-0.16)   (0.02) (-0.07)   (0.18)
Field gradient (%) (-2.19)   (0.33) (-0.20)   (0.49)
Field size (acres) (-0.64)   (0.10) (-0.07)   (0.17)
Surface water (0/1) [-0.06]   [0.06] [-0.11]   [0.11]
*Terms in parenthesis are elasticities.  Terms in square brackets are the percent change
in the probability of adoption as the discrete variable changes from 0 to 1.12
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